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"No conozco esa ley", dijo K.
"Mira, Willem, admite que no conoce la ley,
y a la vez afirma ser inocente".
"I don’t know this law", K. said.
"Look, Willem, he concedes that he doesn’t know the law
and at the same time claims to be innocent".
F. Kafka, El proceso
1. INTRODUCTION1
K.’s warden joke, as T. Ziolkowski (1997) outlines, is in fact a direct reformulation of one
fundamental legal principle according to which "No one can claim innocence on the basis of ignorance of the
existing criminal law" (§ 3 Austrian Criminal Code of 1852). In the words of the Spanish civil code, the
general statement is that "La ignorancia de las leyes no exime de su cumplimiento". ["Ignorance of law does
not exempt from its fulfilment"] (art. 6 CC). Positive legal systems have pervasively tried to guarantee the
efficacy of their norms against any alleged claim of "ignorance" or "unawareness" of law. This general
provision, as many other legal principles, results from a historical process of codification of law. After long-
lasting nineteenth-century codification controversies, twentieth century law emerges in the European States as
an autonomous and coherent system of norms which is claimed to be "self-contained"2. In the last decades of
the twentieth century, however, the so-called crisis of "normative models" seems to have run parallel with the
crisis of the State and the crisis of the representative democracy.
The contention of this paper is not to review the reflections of these crises in the recent works of both
legal and social scholars. Rather, the aim is to offer some empirical data about the emergence of new patterns
of interaction in legal settings, in order to give an account of the transformation of our contemporary Spanish
law system. If new patterns of interaction are taking form in contemporary Spanish law, they must happen to
occur in situated contexts (in both legal organizations and institutions) and in particular situations where
actual people -some of them being aware or partially aware of certain changes- interact (legal professionals,
paralegal professionals, lay people). The steps towards a new model must be then carefully described by
means of a situated micro-analysis.
The main purpose of this paper is to offer some clues of this legal transition, focusing the analysis on
a topic that has been (and still is) very controversial in the contemporary Spanish society: the conscientious
objection to the military service. The analysis will largely rely on ethnographic data obtained in a criminal
case recording3. Nevertheless, as far as the information needed to frame the analysis in a legal transition
context is not entirely contained in this particular event, a broader ethnographic work was carried out4. One
main assumption here is that the legal decision to be reconstructed must be framed into an interpretative
context where different dimensions of knowledge are to be considered: (i) the participants’ background (their
professional status, membership, affiliations, etc.); (ii) the organizational background (practices, instructions,
rules); (iii) the legal background (legal procedures, norms, jurisprudence); (iv) the political background
(criminal policies, institutional conflict, public discussions, etc.). The retrieval of a multidimensional frame of
ethnographic knowledge allows the interpretation of the empirical data in order to provide further insight into
the main hypothesis entertained: (i) the crisis of the Spanish judicial system is partly related to the inner
disfunctions and inefficiencies inherited from the recent non-democratic past; (ii) despite legal professionals’
awareness of these inconsistencies, the effort to overcome the current problems of the judicial system clashes
with the absence of alternative devices to render justice more accessible to the citizens (or to put in words of
the 1978 Spanish Constitution , to open "the citizens’ participation in the Justice Administration").
Let us conclude this brief introduction with the words of a Spanish judge expressing this sort of "K.’s
malaise" about our own fin de siècle law paradigm.
El artículo 6 del Código Civil establece que la ignorancia de la ley no excusa de su cumplimiento,
algo bastante significativo de hasta qué punto se ha minusvalorado la necesidad de hacer comprensible la
conducta que se pretende a través del Derecho. (...) Así, el Derecho, cuyo único objeto es regular las
conductas sociales de los seres humanos, vive tan de espaldas a los comportamientos que no es extraño que
resulten estériles los esfuerzos por salir de la crisis en la que, desde hace mucho tiempo, la sociedad moderna
ha hundido a la Justicia (M. Carmena, 1998)5.
2. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: A CONTROVERSIAL CRUX
2.1 Conscientious objection in late Francoism
In 1971, the European Council (Resolution 22-1-71) exhorted the Spanish Government to modify the
extreme severity of laws towards the increasing number of conscientious objectors, coming from a wide
spectrum of political tendencies:
La objeción de conciencia en este país comenzó siendo un fenómeno fundamentalmente urbano en el
que confluían ideas marxistas, libertarias o cristianas y que agrupaba inicialmente tanto a partidarios de las
guerras de liberación como de las comunas rurales. Teniendo como referencia la lucha por la objeción de
conciencia en Francia y los ejemplos de otras grandes campañas de desobediencia civil, estos primeros
objetores al servicio militar se empiezan a organizar a principios de los años setenta para exigir que se
reconozca el derecho a la objeción de conciencia y la alternativa de un servicio social sustitutorio  (P. Ibarra,
1992)6.
The Military Justice Code of 1945 charged conscientious objectors with prison penalties ranging
from six to twenty years 7. Furthermore, as the exemption to the military service was not subsequently
accorded, they could be prosecuted if the rejection persisted. That legal regulation was attenuated in 1973
with the lowering of prison penalties -from three to eight years- and the consideration of the exemption of
military duties. However, laws introduced a life inhabilitation to act political rights and to access public jobs.
With the exception of Rumania and Albania, Spain reached the new democracy with the most severe punitive
system to repress conscientious objectors (V. Sampedro Blanco, 1997).
2.2. Conscientious objection after the 1978 Spanish Constitution
The new political frame inaugurated by the 1978 Spanish Constitution opens the way for a full
exercice of conscientious objection. Two years earlier, while imprisoned conscientious objectors benefited
from a general amnesty (L.D. 30-7-76), the recently created Conscientious Objectors Movement8 (MOC) and
other pressure groups started their vast campaign to achieve a regulation of conscientious objection similar to
the rest of the European countries 9.
The 1978 Spanish Constitution acknowledges conscientious objection not as a fundamental right but
as a cause of exception to the compulsory military service (art. 30 EC). It also makes a provision for a further
legal development of its exercice, as well as for the setting-up of an eventual social service. In 1984, after the
parliamentary discussion of several law projects, two norms were enacted to fulfil the constitutional
requirement10. Beyond the traditional delay that usually features legal development of constitutional rights in
Spain, this six-year gap seems to confirm a contrasted correlation: European countries with compulsory
military services have restricted and delayed conscientious objection policies, whereas the most ancient and
tolerant policies belong to those countries with more professional armies (V. Sampedro Blanco, 1997). Thus,
it becames clear that conscientious objection policies are deeply intertwined with defence policies concerning
the overall transformation of the army models themselves:
Para comprender las tendencias al cambio de la organización militar hay que tener en
consideración las presentes transformaciones derivadas tanto del nuevo entorno de las relaciones
internacionales como de la propia sociedad nacional. De especial relevancia es el debilitamiento relativo de
las formas centrales de la organización social que han sido características de la modernidad: el Estado-
Nación, los mercados nacionales, la ciudadanía democrática y las fuerzas armadas de masas. Dicho de otra
manera, se está produciendo un crecimiento sustancial de organizaciones sociales globales que han alterado
las condiciones bajo las cuales los Estados-Nación pueden esperar ejercer un poder, mantener la lealtad de
los ciudadanos o levantar y desplegar su poderío militar. Estos cambios van acompañados de un
desplazamiento cultural de las actitudes y opiniones del público  (J.A. Olmeda, 1997)11.
In the late eighties, the consensus about the compulsory military service was already broken in Spain.
Even within the army the positive opinion towards professionalisation was not unusual: in 1989, 53% of the
high officers were for a professional army; in 1991, 81% of the high air officers declared the same preference
(P. Ibarra, 1992). On the other hand, in 1997 a CIS survey showed a parallel evolution in the public opinion:
74’6% of Spanish citizens were for a professional army.
Meanwhile, the number of conscientious objection in Spain experimented an exponential growth. As
a result, Spain leads nowadays the European ratios concerning the social incidence of conscientious objection
(V. Sampedro Blanco, 1997): from 1985 to 1991, a number of 92.651 Spanish citizens were legally declared
conscientious objectors by the National Council of Conscientious Objection (P. Ibarra, 1992); at the end of
1994, this number rose to 253.924, multiplying 32 times in a decade  (V. Sampedro Blanco, 1997). In 1995,
the percentage of conscientious objectors over the total of conscriptors was of 40% (V. Sampedro Blanco,
1997)12. The 30th September of 1997 the requests amounted 551.539. The Chart 1 shows the evolutive trend
requests in the last decade.
1984 Acts, born within this ambiance of widespread conscription’s rejection (due to both
inefficiency reasons and political or ideological attitudes), encountered the frontal opposition of many
conscientious objection movements -claiming for law reform or civil desobedience- and the criticisms of
several legal professional organisations. Far away from reducing the public debate, the regulation of
conscientious objection achieved with 1984 Acts rendered the matter a controversial crux in social, political13,
legal, and judicial settings 14. We will focuse now on the last two aspects in order to frame more accurately our
etnographic data analyzed below.
3. JUGGLERS OF LAW
Lo cierto es que la reforma [CP 1995] no ha podido ser más desafortunada. Es urgente que se
proceda a modificar esos artículos en los que las penas a imponer consistan en restricciones parciales de
determinados derechos y por períodos de tiempo no superiores a los dos años. Mientras no se modifique el
sistema de penas, tendrán que ser Jueces y Fiscales quienes mediante sus resoluciones y calificaciones
jurídicas atemperen el excesivo rigor penal de estas conductas, bien aplicando eximentes o atenuantes de la
responsabilidad criminal, o solicitando indultos y aplicando los beneficios de la condena condicional. Esta
rebaja en las penas facilitaría además que se formase un criterio unificado en los tribunales españoles sobre
esta materia, que acabaría con el problema existente hoy en día, de que las penas varíen en más o en menos
dependiendo de la Comunidad Autónoma donde acaezcan los hechos, sin necesidad de que los Jueces hayan
de acudir a la práctica de “malabarismos jurídicos” (J.A. Sainz Ruiz, 1996)15.
These words from an Spanish prosecutor express the need for a legal professionals’ adaptative
behaviour when dealing with a legal frame perceived as too rigid if routinely applied, as it was the case with
conscientious objection regulation. What characterizes this creative behavior, to quote P. Casanovas (1997) is
that:
[Its] features are not individual properties. Rather, I conceive them as structural and ecological
properties of the relationship between social culture, organizational ambiance and legal setting. Each
individual activates their learning and professional experience through them. They can be described, then, as
tacit knowledge: implicit constraints or guidelines for action and thinking16.
From its very beginning, laws of 1984 had to face many legal objections. Political institutions such
as the Spanish Ombudsman or judicial courts such the Audiencia Nacional presented the Constitutional Court
their doubts about the constitutional adjustment of the legal regulation of the conscientious objection17.
Constitutional Court Sentence of 27th October 1987, showing the opposite views of the Magistrates, denied
all their legal claims and maintained the current regulation. Since then, many judicial organs have requested
the High Court for legal pronouncements about specific aspects of these laws, with identical results 18.
Since the Spanish Supreme Court [Tribunal Supremo] has not the competence to unify the legal
criteria applying to conscientious objection judicial processes, there is a vast and contradictory minor
jurisprudence regarding this matter. Many of these Judges and Tribunals’ sentences reflect the multiple legal
ways to achieve solutions that disminish the punitive consequences of Law 8/84 or lead to the defendants’
absolution. With this aim, constitutional principles such as the preeminence of "individual’s dignity" (art. 10.1
EC) or fundamentals rights such as the "freedom of consciousness" (art. 16 EC) are directly invoked to justify
the absolution. Other sentences, while declaring defendant’s guilty, call for disminishing circumstances
lowering the penalty (such as the "state of necessity"), legal principles such as the "error in believing to act
righfully" or the final proposal of an indult. It is important to notice that these argumentative legal devices are
constructed by judges as a flexible tool allowing not only to give new "legal light" to the objector’s
punishable behavior, but also to take into consideration the individual and the social interests at stake.
However, these sentences are only the final product of a previous process of collective reasoning
involving both prosecutors and lawyers. We do not know much about how this process actually works in
judicial courts. The aim of the second part of this paper is to give some light on this interactive decision-
making process, stemming from our own ethnographic data. The social, political, and legal context already
outlined frames the decision-making process in which our particular down-to-earth "legal jugglers" are
involved.
4. SPACE AND SETTING
The case recorded was heard before the Low Criminal Court of Sabadell (Barcelona) in May 199519.
It could be said that, during the professionals’ interaction before the oral hearing, the courtroom ritual space
lacks the symbolic character that it still has in the oral hearing: legal professionals create a dynamic space
overcoming the physical elements that, later on, will constitute the visible landmarks of the institutional
distance that legal professionals maintain towards the defendant.
Much has been discussed about the aesthetics of courts and the need to suppress the use of gowns,
wigs, mallets and other ritual elements still used in many European countries (J.L. Aulet, 1998)20. In Spanish
low criminal courts gowns are the single ritual garment, furnitures are not especially rich in symbols (there
are only the Spanish and the Autonomous Community flags, the King’s picture and the constitutional
emblem), and the wooden low dais is not very high. Like in Sabadell low criminal courts, the courtroom
setting is much more shaped by bureaucratic severity than by judicial sumptuousness.
5. SYNOPSIS
The case involves one single fact: the defendant was a young man who had been legally declared
"conscientious objector" five years earlier and, when formally contacted, he refused to do the compulsory
"social service".The public prosecutor’s writ of indictment which opens the case was about the defendant’s
rejection to serve the alternative social service. In principle, the prosecutor pleaded for him two years, four
months and one day of prison, whereas the lawyer pleaded his absolution. Nevertheless, both prosecutor and
lawyer had reached a previous arrangement to dismiss the punishment and they communicate it to the judge.
The latter, who used to absolve defendants in those cases, considers the possibility to ignore the agreement in
order to absolve the defendant. But being aware of the risks of such a decision (the ordinary refusal of
absolutory sentences by the superior criminal court) submits to the defendant the maintenance of the
agreement, who eventually accepts it.
It is important to outline here that the magistrate involved in this case was an active and well-known
member of a Spanish judges’ association ("Jueces para la Democracia"21) that had already claimed the law
reform in different professional fora. In 1996 -one year later the case considered took place- the same
magistrate requested the High Court [Tribunal Constitucional] for the constitutional adjustment of the art. 2.3
of Law 8/84, calling for the principle of "interdiction of the arbitrariness of all the public powers" (art. 9.3
EC). To put in his own words:
Tal arbitrariedad se produce cuando se otorga distinta sanción penal, sin razonar motivadamente
las causas de dicha regulación discriminatoria, a conductas que merecen igual reproche jurídico-social y,
con mayor razón aún, cuando se sanciona con pena más grave un comportamiento aceptado por amplias
capas de la sociedad, cuya antijuricidad es altamente cuestionable y cuestionada por obedecer a lógicas e
inherentes consecuencias del ejercicio de los derechos a la libertad ideológica y de expresión22.
6. SEQUENCES
6.1. " Gown-less" decision-making: what is "legally obvious"
When making decisions in court, differences between "formal" and "informal" situations tend to blur:
any context of communication is set-up on the basis of interaction patterns retrieved from similar previous
situations. If we bear in mind that in Spanish criminal courts roughly 30% of sentences are obtained as a
result of pre-court settlements 23, we may hypothesize that legal professionals have interiorised -at least in
some degree- the most suitable interaction patterns to reach satisfactory agreements in court. If this is true, it
would be better to speak of "ritualised" versus "non-ritualised" or subliminal interaction patterns, rather than
of "formal" versus "informal" situations.
It has to be precised that, in some way, the term of "interaction pattern" is a borrowing from the
Watzlawick et alia (1967) studies on the pragmatics on human communication. From their perspective,
pragmatics is conceived not only as the study of the communication effects over the hearer, but approached as
the analysis of the relation which is set up by means of the communication process itself (ibid., p. 24). Under
this view, any participant has not the full control of the communication flow. Instead, we may preliminarily
assume that contexts are created and modified throughout interaction24.
In order to analyse the data, the recorded event can be analitically divided in two basic sequences:
first of all, a sequence containing an initial discussion between the legal professionals involved in the case;
secondly, the act of oral hearing with the final decision of the case. Although it is easy to find sharp
differences featuring both sequences (verbal interaction, gestures, movements, etc.), to consider the first one
as "informal" and the second one as "formal", for the reasons already exposed, would be rather confusing:
despite gowns pacient waiting on the chairs and respective owners’ free movements, a high degree of
"formalism" can be signaled with respect to: (i) participants’ turn-taking; (ii) participants’ information
requests (iii) type of information to be provided; (iv) level of detail of the information provided; (v) reactions
to the expected participants.
Thus, there is a first non ritualised exchange between the magistrate, the prosecutor and the counsel
of the defense which takes place before the scheduled oral session. It lasts 2 minutes and 20 seconds. This
previous exchange, as usually happens in these over-loaded and time-constrained criminal court agendas,
allows the magistrate to get the main pieces of information concerning the case: (i) what the case is about; (ii)
what the prosecutor’s and counsel’s initial proposals are; (iii) the existence of a previous arrangement
achieved between the prosecutor and the defendant’s counsel, as a result of which the former grants a
dismissal of the punishment for the defendant25. The interaction between the three participants, relying in a
great measure on professionals’ previous cases experiences, goes as the following transcription partially
reconstructs:
P1: a lo millor la primera és una comformitat, eh?
M1: el primer del dilluns és una comformitat. val. = molt bé
P2: que que..
L1: soy yo
M2: molt bé senyor abogat
L2: Es que: ..
M3: dígame.
L3: es una prestación, no? de un un incumplimiento.. y: bueno (…) hay conformidad con el ministerio
fiscal.
M4: su cliente la va a aceptar?
L4: (…) es que han habido antecedentes de un caso parecido.. del dos cuatro uno y .. esto me ha supuesto
.. para un testigo de jehová ..
M5: _porque él la causa de: no realizar e:l, la prestación social sustitutoria es por razón ideológica?
L5: =sí es que hay una sentencia.. y
P3: _hem hem se conforma?
M6: esto me pone en un problema a mí, eh? me pone en un problema moral a mí de hacer uso.. de las
facultades del setecientos noventa y tre:s .. tres .. es decir .. de no aceptar la conformidad y ustedes ya
saben que yo absuelvo en estos casos .. por estimar que concurre una eximente completa.
P4: en ese caso en ese caso apelaría.
L6: claro, claro.
M7: vamos a ver.
P5: mira a éste se le pide el dos cuatro uno .
M8: se le pide de entrada el dos cuatro uno .
P6: el dos cuatro uno . yo lo he consultado y: .. bueno a parte de determinar (...) cosas un poco (…) mías
yo lo dejaría: en cuatro meses y un día, la mínima, también cambiaría el tipo .. y aplicaría en vez de:
rehusar a prestar la prestación social el que no se hubiera presenta=do.
M9: =no presentarse.
P7: no presentarse. entonces la pena en grado máximo, la mínima cuatro meses y un día .. vamos yo creo
yo creo que le sale a cuenta.
M10: sí:. sí:. hombre le sale más a cuenta eso que el dos cuatro uno. hombre eso está clarísimo, pero no le
sale tan a cuenta como una absolutoria, que son los precedentes que hay en este juzgado . lo que pasa
es que yo soy consciente del riesgo- a ver a ver como lo haremos soy consciente del riesgo de luego
una apelación, una apelación es más grave a ver . me lo voy a mirar con calma:. a ver siéntense un
momento:
[P1: the first one may be a conformity, eh?
M1: the first one on monday’s a conformity. OK. = very good.
P2: what what..
L1: that’s me.
M2: very good lawyer
L2: the thing is: ..
M3: I’m listening.
L3: it’s a performance, isn’t it? a a non-fulfilment.. and: well (…) the thing is that we are in conformity
with the department of public prosecution.
M4: is your client going to accept it?
L4: (…) the thing is there have been antecedents a similar case..  a number two.four-one you see, so.. and
this has meant to me .. for a jehova’s witness
M5: _because the cause for: not fulfilling th:e, compulsory social service is for an ideological reason, isn’t
it?
L5: =yes the thig is there is a sentence.. and
P3: _hem hem does he comply?
M6: this gets me into a problem, eh? it gets me into a mora l problem of making use .. of the borrowing
power in number seven hundred ninety thre:e .. three .. I mean .. of not accepting the conformity and
you know I usually absolve in these cases .. estimating that there concurs a reason for being exempt.
P4: in that case in that case I’d appeal.
L6: of course, of course.
M7: let’s se..
P5: Look, that one got number two-four-one.
M8: He got in principle number two-four-one.
P6: Number two-four-one . I have consulted it myself, and...well, apart from (...) things (...) I’d leave it in
four months and one day, the minor one. I’d also change the type and apply instead of his denial to
serve the social service, the fact that he didn’t present himself.
M9: Not presenting himself.
P7: Not presenting himself. Then the punishment in the maximum degree, the minor one, four months and
one day. Well, I think, I think that’s worth his while.
M10: Oh yes, yes that’s worth his while better than number two-four-one, you bet, that’s as plain as
pikestaff, but it’s not as advanteageous as one of not guilty, which are the precedents in this court. But
the thing is that I am aware of the risk, let’s see, we’ll talk to him...I’m aware of the risk of later an
appeal, a more serious appeal...let’s see, I’m going to take a long walk at it...OK? Sit down, will you].
In the first section of the sequence (P1-C6) participants let each other know their positions
concerning the case. The case presented to the magistrate by the prosecutor and the counsel is already coded
in abstract legal categories. On the one hand, the prosecutor speaks of the case as a "conformity", which is
received as good news but giving no specific information about its particulars. On the other hand, the counsel
explains that it is a "performance" and a "non-fulfillment", which directly situates the case on the grounds of
8/84 Act.
Nevertheless, the information received is still too abstract for the magistrate to confirm his
acceptance of the settlement. To do this, he needs some specific knowledge about the case. Only when he
learns by the counsel that the defendant is a Jehovah’s Witness, emphasizing the existence of legal
precedings, he may clearly make his view explicit. Quite differenly, abstract legal categories are used here to
code a concrete issue which is directly related to a more general and controversial matter: the Jehovah’s
Witnesses rejection to both military and social services 26.
Perhaps one of the new salient patterns to outline here is that the magistrate anticipates a decision
that the counsel has presented not only as analogical to a similar previous case -this would be a fairly usual
way to proceed- but framed within the context of a broader social and political issue. And this issue is
retrieved not in political terms, but in legal abstract categories. Similarly, being sensitive to defendant’s moral
position in court and, at the same time, having to apply the current legal norms requires far more legal
imagination than strict technical argumentation (which, in any case, in needed only at the end of the process).
This effective legal problem that professionals have to face is suggested by the down-to-earth prosecutor’s
utterance: "In that case I’d appeal" 27. The great uncertainty of a second instance ruling makes the pre-court
settlement a reasonable way to solve the problem, so that the second section of the sequence (M-7 to M-10)
consists on the prosecutor’s and magistrate’s legal articulation of the agreement achieved.
The last part of the sequence (from M7 to M10) allows both judge and prosecutor to determine the
situation. The explicit prosecutor’s categorisation of the case as a "two-four-one" functions here as a sort of
"tracking shot" which puts simultaneously on the foreground four legal categories that remain implicitly
asssumed: (i) the fact: the defendant did not present himself to do the social service when formally asked; (ii)
the crime’s category: a refusal to do the social service when being legally declared "conscientious objector";
(iii) the subsequent punisment: two years, four months and one day of prison ("two-four-one"); (iv) the
applicable norm: the article 2.2 of the 8/1984 Act.
In M8 the magistrate rectifies the assertion specifying that "two-four-one" is just the original
prosecutor’s criminal charge. In P6 he obtains a confirmation and then the prosecutor introduces an additional
specification of the shifting from article 2.2 to article 2.1: "I’d also change the type and apply instead of his
denial to serve the social service, the fact that he didn’t present himself" [" también cambiaría el tipo y
aplicaría en vez de rehusar a prestar la prestación social el que no se hubiera presentado"]. The last clause
overlaps with magistrate’s acceptance of the alternative suggested by the prosecutor (M9), who confirms
again the proposal in P7 and then introduces and explicit causal link between the shifting of the criminal
charge and the punisment dismissal ("Then the punishment in the maximum degree, the minor one, four
months and one day"). ["Entonces la pena en grado máximo la mínima cuatro meses y un día"].
In the legal jargon of law criminal courts, the utterance of expressions like "two-four-one" (it may
also apply to other criminal categories as well) is the fastest way to deal with everyday cases. Those shared
legal categories or "technical prototypes" are communicative devices, explicit contextual landmarks which
probably help to develop the collective legal reasoning that remains implicit in the verbal interaction28. This is
what S. Philips (1984) calls "the labeling decision", which she situates in the context of the criminal trial:
Interestingly enought, criminal litigation is the process through which the ultimate labeling decision
is made. In other words, whereas we readily decide that a plant is a bush or a tree, or that a food is meat or
vegetable, the decision to label an activity as a crime belongs to the jury or the judge of a criminal trial, and
the presentation of evidence of whether activities which occurred do or do not fulfill the elements of the crime
is highly regulated by procedural law. Through trial practice, lawyers learn what sorts of evidence are
routinely presented in order to meet or satisfy the statutory definitions of crimes.
In our case, however, what seems readily agreed by legal professionals is the criminal label itself:
according to rules of 8/84 Act, they see defendant’s behavior as number "two-four-one" as easily as they
would see a plant as a bush (in that sense, there is not a legal but a "moral dilemma": does that behavior
deserve such a prison punishment?). Thus, what is really at stake is not the criminal label, but the possibility
of tempering its consequences in a legally satisfactory manner. And this is done within the frame of a "gown-
less" negotiation whose succesful outcome requires the learning of professional practices and skills barely
regulated by procedural laws 29.
6.2. Judge’s reconstruction of legal pre-court settlement: some paradoxes
    Magistrate: This judge considers that the principle of " effective judicial tutelage" in article 117.3
from the LECr obliges me to leave to your own discretion, to your own discretion, the decision of
whether you want to run this risk of, on the one hand, be absolved in first instance and condemned in
second, that is just a hypothesis, but it is possible, or, making use of the facultaties of liberty of
acceptance of the agreement which the prosecutor and the defense have reached, resign yourself to the
sentece request which they have suggested. In this second hypothesis, if you accepted for that security,
this court, even keeping legal reserves on the contents of that outline agreement, would accept it in
order not to violate to your detriment the possibility of a sentence falling in second instance which
were detrimental to your interests. Have you perfectly understood the explanation I have just given
you?
Defendant: Yes
Magistrate: Do you wish to consult the decision you have to take with your lawyer, before deciding?
Defendant: Yes30
The second sequence of the case consists on the scheduled oral hearing, the so-called "abbreviate
procedure". Once the reading of prosecutor’s indictment is finished, the magistrate reconstructs the decision-
making process performed before the oral hearing session. He lets the defendant know that law allows the
judge to rule out the pre-court settlement if certain legal conditions are fulfilled and, having aquitted
defendants in similar cases, leaves the last decision to him.
Oral hearing usually starts with the judicial secretary’s reading of the prosecutor’s writ of indictment.
According to the Spanish procedural statute (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal) its purpose is to inform the
defendant of the charge against him. In practice, this reading constitutes the ritual fulfilment of a procedural
act, so that it is usually read by the judicial secretary in a monotonous pitch, a high elocution speed and a low
gestuality. In the case reported the magistrate anticipates to the defendant the fulfilment of this act, from
which the latter is supposed to learn the new content of the criminal charge. This anticipation, which may be
interpreted as a judge’s leading transition from plea bargaining to the ritual, aims at the defendant’s
understanding of both the reason for the formal reading act and the criminal charge he is going to face:
    M: Muy bien señor x la señora secretaria judicial le va a leer el escrito de acusación que en su
día formuló el Ministerio Fiscal por un presunto delito de negativa a realizar la prestación social
substitutoria al servicio militar en el cual verá usted que inicialmente se le pedía una condena de dos
años cuatro meses y un día de prisión menor. A continuación le informará del contenido del
preacuerdo al que han llegado en la fase previa a este juicio la fiscalía y su abogado defensor con lo
cual se le reduce a usted la condena en los términos la petición de condena en los términos que se le
dirán. Una vez haya escuchado usted los cargos me manifiesta por favor en primer lugar si se
reconoce culpable de ese delito de haber cometido ese delito o por el contrario se considera usted
inocente, y considera que no ha infringido ninguna norma legal y en la primera hipótesis, solamente
en la primera hipótesis, me dice usted si está de acuerdo con la pena que han consensuado antes de
este acto el fiscal y la defensa.
    [Very good mister R., the chief clerck is going to read you the writ of indictment which the Ministry
of the Public prosecution made for an alleged denial to fulfill the compulsory social service for those
who refuse to do the military service in which you will see that one requested a medium-term prison
sentence of two years, four months and one day. Next, she will inform you of the contents of the
outline agreement which the Ministry of the Public prosecution and your defending lawyer have
reached in the phase preceding this law suit, in which your sentence is reduced according to the terms,
the sentence request, according to the terms which will be specified. Once the charges have been you
listened, you declare, please, in the first place, wheter you admit your guilt to that offence, to having
committed that offence, or on the contrary, you consider yourself innocent, and consider that you have
infringed no legal norm. And, in the first hypothesis, only in the first hypothesis, you tell me whether
you agree with the outline agreement which the prosecutor and the defense have reached before this
action].
However, this judge’s explicit effort of familiarising the defendant with the oral hearing ritual
development clashes with the way he expresses his attempt -highly ritualised itself- and the criptic content of
the subsequent secretary’s reading. On the one hand, the magistrate behaves maintaining a distant attitude of
institutional authority. On the other, focusing on what is verbally communicated, the pragmatic descriptors’
analysis (M. Poblet, E. Pascual, A. Roig, J. Comín, P. Casanovas, 1998) has shown the high number of
cognitive metaoperations that the hearer must perform in order to understand the magistrate’s instructions. In
other words, the defendant must decodify not only the unfamiliar technical expressions of magistrate’s
language -the expressions’ meaning level- but also the way he qualifies or refers to them (his using of legal
language to speak of legal language). This is fairly clear in the ongoing magistrate’s identity self-references
throughout the ritual session (the use of abstract expressions such as "this tribunal", "the court which judges
you" or "this judge" instead of personal pronouns), in the identity’s prosecutor references ("the Public
Prosecution Office") or in legal considerations such as the following one:
(...) este tribunal, en precedentes anteriores en casos similares al que hoy se juzga, y lo pone en
conocimiento de usted, sin perjuicio de lo que resulte de la práctica de la prueba que se desarrollará
en este juicio oral, ha dictado: sentencias *absolutorias contra: acusa:do:s que están imputa:do:s por
hechos *similares a los que usted, hoy, tiene en su contra. sin embargo, este tribunal tampoco quiere
que usted desconozca la siguiente circunstancia. en primer lugar, que el criterio de dictar sentencias
absolutorias en este tipo de delito:.. es minoritaria en los tribunales del estado español. y por lo tanto
no existe una jurisprudencia: *unitaria y consensuada sobre esta materia.
[this court, in previous precedents in cases similar to the one being judged today, and it makes this
known to you wtihout prejudgement of what may result of the presentation of the proofs which will be
developed in this oral trial, has pronounced sentences *of not guilty against defendants who are
imputed for *similar facts to the ones which you have against you. nevertheless, this court does not
want you to be ignorant of the following circumstance. in the first place, that in this type of offence the
criterion of pronouncing sentences of not guilty in this kind of crime:.. is minoritory in the courst of
the spanish state. and thus there exists no *unitary and consensual jurisprudence on that matter].
As a result, communication becomes paradoxical (P. Watzlawick, J. Beavin Bavelas, D.D. Jackson,
1967)31. The paradoxical nature of this sequence is due to the dissociation between judge’s will to leave the
defendant the last decision about the case and the way this will is expressed. First of all, he tries to reconstruct
the decision-making process that took place before the oral session and then leaves the final decision to the
defendant. However, the attempt to explain in plain words what legal professionals considers as "legally
obvious" is performed stemming from the same legal language structures.
Perhaps the most striking linguistic feature of magistrate’s monologues is that, being oral speeches,
they rather seem a well-written legal text. However, this "written-flavour" causes small wonder considering
that not only the main pieces of criminal suits are written text 32 (i.e. the vast bulk of documents and reports in
which the files consist, a great number of technical evidences, sentences, etc.) but also that law itself can be
considered as a written realm. In Spanish law faculties, to learn law means to learn, and sometimes to
memorise as well, "written law". This memorising effort is further reinforced by the studies programme that
both judges and prosecutors candidates have to follow. Legal concepts are therefore acquired not only by
means of a specific and technical vocabulary, but also by a complex set of linguistic chunks. Try to by-pass
"legalese" when making understandable what is "legally obvious" may certainly be a hard task. A further
consideration may help to explain one of the reasons why communication collapses between magistrate and
defendant at the verbal dimension: even if text cohesion is fully achieved by understandable grammatical
structures 33, there is a complete lack of familiar conceptual content organized in "culturally meaningful ways"
(E. Hutchins, 1980).
In addition, there are inconsistencies at the metacommunicative dimension that frame the linguistic
construction of the speech. The magistrate’s attempt to break the ritualised interaction patterns in court,
favorising the defendant’s participation in the decision-making process, contrast with the distant authority
from which he performs his institutional identity. Furthermore, neither the ritual space nor the verbal language
used enhance his participation. As a result, the communication flow that the magistrate meant to be fluent is
blocked by the effective manner in which instructions are performed. Defendant’s eventual acceptance of the
agreement puts him in a K.’s perplexity situation: he pleads guilty, agreeing to a legal settlement which
remains strange and obscure to him.
7. CONCLUSION
The great significance of these type of decision-making processes in the Spanish judicial system
contrasts with the rigidity of judicial ritual elements. Albeit the legal reform in 1988 (7/88 Act of 26th
December) acknowledges the full effects of pre-court settlements, norms does not provide further facilities for
them to be achieved. The lack of an specific workplace of negotiation, for instance, leads in some cases to the
judges’ offering their chambers or, in some others, to the familiar scenes of corridors’ negotiation.
This court case may help us to see what it could be preliminary termed as a "transitional" model of
law towards a fully "participative" one. Its particular "transitivity" would be reflected by the legal
professionals introduction of new patterns of interaction, breaking into a space which still preserves its
physical and communicative barriers. Thus, judges and magistrates, prosecutors and lawyers tend to perform
their activities throughout a broader openness towards non-institutionalised values, serching for decisions
much closer to the scheme "problem-available solutions" of particular cases than to that of "norm-
interpretation-application" (P. Casanovas, M. Poblet, forthcoming). Orality gains terrain slowly and new
professional skills are required (flexible negotiation routines, consideration of legal alternatives, risks
evaluations, creative technical argumentation, etc.). Individuals’ general attitudes are similarly "transitives":
although general goals such as "citizens’ participation" or rather concrete practices such as "negotiation"
already pertain to some extent to their professional background, much of the particular devices required to
develop and improve those practices are still to be found. Similarly, the study of these new interaction
patterns in court cannot be fully constructed on the basis of an ethnography of verbal communication.
Similarly, the representation of the pragmatic pluridimensionality of contexts set up by legal professionals in
court requires to develop a methodology able to articulate, on the basis of a broad ethographic research, the
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NOTES
1. This paper is the result of a collective ethnographic research carried out in Barcelona and Sabadell criminal courts
since 1995, which includes the audiovisual recording of some trials. The case studied is one of them. Ethnography,
video edition, transcriptions and English trasnlation have been done by the Sociolegal Studies Group (GRES)
members. In addition, audiovisual data have been analysed in team sessions where most ideas presented here had
already been discussed.
2. According to A.E. Pérez-Luño (1997) "Los principios generales del derecho son un mito jurídico, pero un mito que
responde a una necesidad propia de los ordenamientos jurídicos de los Estados de Derecho: reconocer el valor de la
seguridad jurídica" (p. 22). [General legal principles are a legal myth, but one that fulfils a legal systems’ need: to
recognise the value of legal security].
3. The empirical basis of this study will be audiovisual data from a trial at the Sabadell Criminal Court. The recording,
lasting 20 minutes and 21 seconds, was carried out in the frame of research activities of the Sociolegal Studies Group
(GRES) in 1995. A written transcription of the interaction is also done by the analysts in order to facilitate the tasks
of codification.
4. On this view, the GRES etnographic fieldwork also implies the elaboration of data concerning the tasks of both
prosecutors and lawyers organizations in situated contexts.
5. ["Article 6 of the Civil code establishes that ignorance of law does not exempt from its fulfilment, which significantly
shows that the need to make law required behaviour understandable has been undermined. Hence, law, aiming at the
regulation of human beings social behaviour, turns its back to those behaviours. It is not surprising, therefore, that
efforts to overcome the long-lasting justice crisis in our modern society are vain"].
6. ["Conscientious objection started to be in this country a mostly urban phenomenon which gathered either Marxist,
libertarian or Christian ideas, and joined both partisans of liberation wars and rural communes. Having the fight for
conscientious objection in France and the examples of another big civil desobedience campaigns as main references,
those first conscientious objectors organised themselves in the early 70’s to ask for the conscientious objection right
ackowledgment and the alternative of a social service"].
7. As G. Landrove (1990) reports, the sounding international impact of the "Contijoch’s Case" was on the immediate
political background: A. Contijoch was a Jehovah Witness carpenter imprisoned several times for his conscientious
objection. When he eventually received pardon in 1970, he had already spent eleven years in prison.
8. See P. Ibarra (1992) for the origins of the Conscientious Objectors Movement and other Spanish collectives.
9. The countries within the European Union that acknowledge the conscientious objection right in its Constitutions are
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (J.A. Sainz Ruiz, 1996). The rest of them (with the exception of Greece,
that does not explicitly recognise this right) have developed legal regulations.
10. 48/1984 and 8/84 Acts of 26 December 1984.
11. ["In order to understand the changing trends of the military organisation we need to take into account the current
transformations stemming from the new frame of international relations and the national society. The relative
weakening of the most characteristic forms of social organization is especially outstanding: the national-State, the
national markets, the democratic citizenship, and the mass army forces. In other words, a substantial global social
organisations growing is been taking place, changing the conditions under which national-States used to exercise
their power, maintained citizens’ loyalty and displayed their military force. These changes occur hand in hand with a
citizenship opinions and attitudes cultural shifting"].
12. As this author shows, conscientious objectors movements are largely responsible for this continuous increase: "By
directly opposing the political measures adopted by successive governments, objectors have weakened and greatly
subverted the legal consequences of their refractory conduct" (ídem, p. 172).
13. V. Sampedro Blanco (1996).
14. Act 8/84, today derogated by the Criminal Code of 1995, established for legally declared objectors non fulfilling the
substitory social service a set of penalties ranging from four months of major arrest to two years, four months of
minor prison. On the other hand, since 1992, citizens refusing both the conscription and the legal status of
‘conscientious objector’ had to face judicial processes according to parallel rules in the the Criminal Code (till that
year, this kind of insubmission mattered to military courts and penalties were higher). Since 1995, all kinds of
objection and insubmission are regulated by the Criminal Code, and a 8-12 years inhabilitation for public jobs has
substituted the prison penalties.
15. ["Criminal code reform could not be more unfortunate. It is urgent to modify those articles partially limiting some
rights. Meanwhile, judges and prosecutors will have to temper the excessive severity of punishments by means of
estimating reasons for exemption, asking for government pardon or applying for conditional sentence benefits. This
would facilitate the adoption of a unified criterion in Spanish courts that would eliminate the problem of having
different degrees of punishment according to each Autonomous Community, and thus the need to ‘legal juggling’
judges’ practices"].
16. These features are: (1) cooperative behavior; (2) collective reasoning; (3) formal decisions through informal
situations; (4) individual evaluation of criminal alternative possibilities; (5) implementation of learning ability; (6)
different inter-institutional and extra-institutional relationships; (7) different "elite consciousness" (P. Casanovas,
1997).
17. More specifically, the Ombudsman (echoing a wide set of contests from MOC, Basquian Parliament, Christians for
the Peace, etc.) claimed the fundamental right rank of conscientious objection in the Spanish Constitution and the
unequal treatment of conscientious objectors in serving a social service much longer than the military one. The
Audiencia Nacional, on the other hand, considered unconstitutional the deny to exercise conscientious objection
when serving the military service.
18. See the widespread Constitutional Court Jurisprudence about conscientious objection in J.A. Sainz Ruiz (1996).
19. GRES (1995).
20. According to J.L. Aulet (1998), the use of these aesthetic elements depends on the State model. Thus, non-
authoritarian States which allow legal professionals self-government tend to have more sumptuous judicial rituals and
professionals exhibit a strong aesthetic-elitist component, whereas traditionally authoritarian States tend to devaluate
the ritual role of the trial and to consider magistrates as civil servants.
21. 23% of the Spanish Judges and Magistrates belong to the professional association Jueces por la Democracia,
whereas 57’2% of them are engaged in the largest and conservative-oriented Asociación Profesional de la
Magistratura (Annual Report of the General Council of Judicial Power, 1997).
22. ["This arbitrariness occurs when a diferent punishment is given to the same behaviors deserving identical reproval
and, furthermore, when a behavior which is broadly accepted by the society is penalized with a more severe
punishment, bearing in mind that its current legal status is both questinable and questioned, because these behaviors
are simply the logical and inner consequences of ideological and expression freedom rights"]. Cuestión de
inconstitucionalidad nº 3653/1996 and RTC 380/1996 (Aranzadi Jurisprudence Database).
23. In 1996, Spanish criminal courts dictated an amount of 102.501 sentences, 30.692 of them on the basis of a pre-court
settlement (Annual Report of the Public Prosecution Office, 1997).
24. As P. Casanovas (1999) recently wrote: "we may describe interaction as the continuous context modification among
participants on communicative events. Let me add that interaction itself may be patterned in the participants’ mind,
especially if they belong to an organization, they have been trained within the organizational mood and they share
some kind of previous learned collective, cooperative or coordinated experiences".
25. This is what is legally termed a "pre-court settlement", usually consisting in an agreement made between the public
prosecutor and the defendant’s counsel which stipulates that the defendant will plead guilty in exchange for some sort
of reduction of the original criminal charge.
26. The sentence invoked by the counsel was  dicted by another criminal court in 1992 (Madrid, Criminal Court number
4, Sentence 75 of 6th March 1992). It opened a great public debate (in the media as well as in the academia) about
conscientious objection and civil desobedience. The controversy, well-known by legal professionals, is reported in
the M. Atienza’s book Tras la Justicia (1993) under the title of "Un dilema moral". The counsel had brought the
book to the court to prepare his argumentation and the magistrate reflects on the case as puting him "in a moral
problem".
27. Spanish Public Prosecution Office [Fiscalia General del Estado] gives in its Instructions the criminal policies that
each Autonomous Community Prosecution Office has to follow (e.g Instructions 1/91 and 4/92). As the given
orientation is to appeal absolutory sentences, the internal organizations allowing adaptative decisions -such as the
Catalan one- must search for settlements that does not blatantly contradict the general instruction.
28. However, as far as the relationship between language as an expression of thought and thought itself  remains an open
question for cognitive scientists (R. Jackendoff, 1996), we cannot set up a model of this collective reasoning entilery
based on the participants’ linguistic expressions. If there is no reasoning in language itself we should assume that
there is no logic to model conversation. All we have in the linguistic expression dimension are some clues of the
cognitive processes underlying conversation, but the relationship between the use of communicative devices such as
"technical prototypes" and those cognitive mechanisms has to be investigated.
29. At this stage, and trying to go beyond an ethnography of verbal interaction, the methodology developed by GRES (P.
Casanovas, 1994; P. Casanovas, M. Reinert and GRES, 1995; P. Casanovas, J. Mach, E. Ardèvol, 1998; M. Poblet,
E. Pascual, A. Roig, J. Comin, P. Casanovas, 1998) consists on the reconstruction of the pluridimensionality of
communicative contexts set up by the participants by means of the so-called pragmatic descriptors, to avoid
confusion with the applied linguistics use of "pragmatic markers" (D. Schiffrin, 1987; G. Redecker, 1990; B. Fraser,
1990, 1996; A. Knott & T. Sanders, 1998; C. Kroon, 1998; U. Lenk, 1998; R. Risselada, 1998). Pragmatic descriptors
consists on a dynamic set of conventionally defined indicators pointing out those metacommunicative elements,
encoded or not in language, which cognitively frame the linguistic construction of speech (M. Poblet, E. Pascual, A.
Roig, J. Comín, P. Casanovas, 1998).
30. GRES (1997).
31. We have used the term of  "paradox" (E. Pascual; M. Poblet, forthcoming) when describing the communicative
difficulties and inconsistencies arised in court interaction that, in some way, affect all the participants. In their
classical study, P. Watzlawick, J. Beavin Bavelas y D. Jackson (1967) identified as "pragmatic paradoxes" those
instructions which, in the frame of interpersonal communication, request an specific behavior that, by its own nature,
it can only be spontaneous. As an exemple, those order or indications such as "Be spontaneous" or "Don’t be so
obedient". In the legal field, they quote the article 27 of the Swiss civil code: "No one is allowed to renonce to his
freedom or to limit it as to violate law or moral".
32. It may be interesting to notice that, although Spanish Criminal Procedure Law (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal)
establishes an "orality principle" which has to preside the criminal procedure, this is usually conceived (with the
exception of cross-examination acts) as a "reading principle".
33. Text cohesion, as T. Givón (1993) outlines, does not necessarily mean "text comprehension", as a cognitive operation
in which both "working-memory buffer" and "episodic memory" are involved: "It is fairly well established that the
working memory buffer for text is severely limited, perhaps retaining no more than 2-5 clauses at a time, or roughly
8-20 seconds of verbatim text. (...). During the short-time span of the buffer, whatever portion of the ‘external’
speech signal that is at all to survive in longer-term memory must be translated rapidly into some other form of
episodic mental representation.
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